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Humanitarian Financial
Intervention
Evan J. Criddle*

Over the past several decades, states have used international asset freezes with increasing
frequency as a mechanism for promoting human rights abroad. Yet the international law governing this mechanism, which I refer to as ‘humanitarian financial intervention’, remains
fragmented. This article offers the first systematic legal analysis of humanitarian financial
intervention. It identifies six humanitarian purposes that states may pursue through asset
freezes: preserving foreign assets from misappropriation, incapacitating foreign states or
foreign nationals, coercing foreign states or foreign nationals to forsake abusive practices,
compensating victims, ameliorating humanitarian crises through humanitarian aid or postconflict reconstruction, and punishing human rights violators. Whether intervening states
may pursue these objectives in any given context depends upon the interplay between several
international legal regimes, including international investment law, collective-security agreements such as the UN Charter, the customary law of countermeasures, the law of armed conflict, and customary law governing the enforcement of judicial decisions. By disentangling
the various international legal regimes that govern humanitarian financial intervention,
this article furnishes a preliminary road map for evaluating the legality of past, present, and
future financial interventions – including asset freezes directed against the Qaddafi regime
during the 2011 Libyan Revolution.

1 Introduction
For a generation of international lawyers who came of age during the 1980s and
1990s, the words ‘humanitarian intervention’ call to mind images of NATO bombers
over Kosovo, US Marines in Haiti and Panama, and blue-helmeted UN peacekeepers in
Somalia and East Timor. Scholarly commentary on the law and ethics of humanitarian intervention has focused almost exclusively on the threat or use of force in military and peacekeeping operations. Over the past several decades, however, states have
developed a variety of other tools for advancing human rights abroad. These tools
include non-forcible measures such as asset freezes, arms embargoes, travel bans,
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1

2

Although some states might be tempted to argue that international asset freezes violate the UN Charter’s
prohibition against the use of force, the inclusion of economic measures within Art. 2(4) was debated
and soundly rejected by a vote of 26–2 during the drafting of the Charter: see Chayes, ‘Nicaragua, the
United States, and the World Court’, 85 Columbia L Rev (1985) 1445, at 1463 n. 89; Elagab, ‘Economic
Measures Against Developing Countries’, 41 Int’l & Comp LQ (1992) 682, at 688.
See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection
of Their Independence and Sovereignty, GA Res. 2131 (XX) (21 Dec. 1965), at paras 1–2 (hereinafter
the ‘Declaration on Intervention’); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res.
2625 (XXV) (24 Oct. 1970) (hereinafter the ‘Friendly Relations Declaration’); Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA), Merits, Judgment [1986] ICJ Rep 14, at 101–103,
paras 191–192, 202–203. Although the term ‘humanitarian financial intervention’ may encompass
other measures such as bankrolling a foreign insurgency to undermine a repressive regime: see Nicaragua,
supra, at paras 195, 205, 242, such measures are beyond the scope of this article.
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and the suspension of diplomatic relations. Among these alternatives to military
force, asset freezes have become the international community’s preferred response
to humanitarian crises. Because asset freezes, as purely economic measures, do not
involve the ‘use of force’ under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,1 they sidestep some of
the thorny legal and ethical issues associated with military intervention. Nonetheless,
international asset freezes qualify as a form of ‘humanitarian intervention’ to the
extent that states freezing foreign assets (‘host states’) purposefully interfere in the
domestic affairs of a foreign state (the ‘target state’), undermining the target state’s
political independence and transgressing legal protections for the fair and equitable
treatment of foreign investment, in order to promote cosmopolitan humanitarian values abroad.2
This article offers the first systematic legal analysis of humanitarian financial intervention. I argue that there are at least six distinct humanitarian objectives that host
states may pursue through international asset freezes: preservation, incapacitation,
coercion, compensation, amelioration, and punishment. Whether host states may
pursue any particular humanitarian objective in a given context depends upon the
interplay between several discrete strands of international law. Generally speaking,
customary norms prohibiting foreign ‘intervention’ and protecting foreign investment from ‘expropriation’ prevent host states from singling out the assets of foreign
states or foreign nationals for a discriminatory asset freeze without their consent.
Hence, when host states impose asset freezes for humanitarian purposes, they bear a
special burden of establishing that international law affirmatively authorizes foreign
intervention into the political and economic affairs of a target state in contravention
of ordinary protections for foreign investment. Host states may satisfy this burden by
linking humanitarian asset freezes to one of four lex specialis regimes. First, collectivesecurity agreements such as the UN Charter permit states to freeze foreign assets as
authorized by the UN Security Council or a comparable regional body. Secondly, under
the customary international law of countermeasures, states may freeze the assets of
target states that violate obligations erga omnes to respect fundamental human rights.
Thirdly, when states undertake humanitarian military intervention, they may freeze
foreign assets pursuant to the law of armed conflict. Fourthly, customary international
law permits states to freeze foreign assets for the enforcement of judicial decisions.
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4

5
6

See Meyers and Balefsky, ‘UN Releases $1.5 Billion in Frozen Qaddafi Assets to Aid Rebuilding of
Libya’, NY Times, 25 Aug. 2011, available at: www.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/world/africa/26assets.
html?pagewanted=all.
E.g., Global Civilians for Peace in Libya, ‘Russia: France Has No Authority To Give Libya Money to Rebels’,
8 Mar. 2011, available at: http://globalciviliansforpeace.com/2011/08/03/russia-france-has-noauthority-to-give-libyan-money-to-he-rebels (Russia).
E.g., ibid. (France).
See UN Charter Art. 2(7) (exempting ‘enforcement measures under Chapter VII’ from the prohibition
against intervention); SC Res. 1970, S/RES/1970 (26 Feb. 2011); SC Res. 1973, S/RES/1973 (17 Mar.
2011).
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Whenever states freeze foreign assets for humanitarian purposes, they must ground
their intervention in one of these four lex specialis regimes, while respecting fundamental norms enshrined in international human rights law (HRL) and international
humanitarian law (IHL).
By weaving together the various strands of international law that govern humanitarian financial intervention, this article furnishes an integrated framework for evaluating the legality of past, present, and future financial interventions. To illustrate the
practical value of this framework, the article examines the framework’s application
to a series of controversies that arose during the 2011 Libyan Revolution, when the
international community froze roughly US$160 billion in assets belonging to individuals and entities associated with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi.3 Although these
asset freezes enjoyed broad international support, international lawyers and diplomats
openly debated whether (or how) the frozen assets could be used to advance humanitarian objectives in Libya. Most experts agreed that the Security Council could use
Libya’s frozen assets as a negotiating chip to persuade the Qaddafi regime to forsake
its violent attacks against peaceful civilian demonstrators. Whether international law
would support other humanitarian objectives was less clear. For example, could host
states leverage Libya’s frozen assets to force Colonel Qaddafi to relinquish power? Could
they liquidate the assets to purchase humanitarian aid for Libyan civilians, compensate
foreign victims of Libyan terrorism, or purchase arms for Libya’s fledgling Transitional
National Council (TNC)? Facing a dizzying array of policy alternatives, some host states
dug in their heels, rejecting all invitations to release frozen assets pending further action
by the Security Council.4 Others proceeded to unfreeze Libyan assets without awaiting
Security Council approval.5 Notably absent from these debates was a rigorous account
of the international legal regimes that govern humanitarian financial intervention.
This article concludes that international law supports key features of the international community’s humanitarian financial intervention in Libya, but it also offers
grounds for criticizing how some states administered – or proposed to administer –
asset freezes against the Qaddafi regime. In accordance with conventional wisdom,
the article confirms that the Security Council’s mandatory sanctions regime against
Libya (Resolutions 1970 and 1973) was consistent with international law, superseding the customary principle of non-intervention.6 Asset freezes imposed by the US and
the EU without prior Security Council authorization also constituted lawful responses
to the Qaddafi regime’s war crimes and crimes against humanity. On the other hand,
this article raises the possibility that France, Italy, and Turkey might have violated
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international law by releasing frozen assets to the TNC without Security Council
authorization, and it rejects proposals advanced by American and French officials during the summer of 2011 for the redistribution of Libyan assets to foreign governments
and victims of Libyan terrorism. The international community’s asset freezes against
the Qaddafi regime thus illustrate both the promise and the limits of state authority to
promote human rights through international financial intervention.

The basic mechanics of international financial intervention are straightforward:
state regulators direct financial institutions to freeze assets of a foreign state or foreign nationals. Once assets have been frozen, they may not be paid out, withdrawn,
transferred, or set off without the host state’s permission. States frequently combine
asset freezes with other measures such as blocking a target state from obtaining loans,
credit, interest payments, transfer payments, and international aid – all in an effort
to limit the target state’s access to foreign capital. In some contexts, humanitarian
financial intervention terminates when a host state ‘unfreezes’ foreign accounts, permitting investors to recover their assets. In other contexts, a host state might decide
instead to redirect frozen assets toward compensating domestic judgment creditors
or funding humanitarian aid or post-conflict reconstruction within the target state.
Although states have employed international asset freezes for decades, they rarely
articulate their objectives with precision, and the international community has yet
to develop a consistent vocabulary for distinguishing the various purposes that asset
freezes may serve in international relations. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
underscored these concerns in a 1995 position paper, ‘Supplement to an Agenda for
Peace’, when he lamented that the Security Council’s objectives for sanctions have
‘not always been clearly defined’ and, indeed, ‘sometimes seem to change with time.
This combination of imprecision and mutability makes it difficult for the Security
Council to agree on when the objectives [of financial sanctions] can be considered to
have been achieved and sanctions can be lifted.’7
Close scrutiny of state practice suggests that states have employed targeted asset
freezes for at least six distinct humanitarian purposes: preservation, incapacitation,
coercion, compensation, amelioration, and punishment. While these purposes are by
no means mutually exclusive, the decision to prioritize one objective over another may
have important consequences for the administration of frozen assets.

A Preservation
On some occasions, host states have frozen foreign assets to preserve them from misappropriation or spoliation. For example, shortly after the outbreak of World War II,
7

Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, at para. 68, UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 (1995) (hereinafter
‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace’).
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2 The Humanitarian Objectives of International Financial
Intervention

Humanitarian Financial Intervention

587

B Incapacitation
International financial intervention may also advance human rights by restricting a target state’s access to resources that could be used to advance pernicious
policies. During World War II, many states froze the offshore assets of Axis powers
to limit their capacity for military aggression.12 More recently, states have endeavoured to combat international terrorism, narco-trafficking, and nuclear proliferation by imposing financial sanctions against renegade non-state actors and their
state sponsors.13 While some of these examples arguably fall outside the scope
of ‘humanitarian intervention’, they illustrate how targeted asset freezes may be
used to limit the destructive capacity of human rights violators abroad. Even when
international asset freezes do not render foreign actors financially incapable of violating human rights, they may shift the political dynamic within a target state,
empowering rights-respecting factions to introduce reforms that would narrow
the legal authority and practical capacity of state and non-state actors to violate
human rights.

C Coercion
A third potential objective of international financial sanctions is coercion: by freezing foreign accounts, host states acquire a powerful bargaining chip that they may

8

9

10
11

12
13

Domke, ‘Western Hemisphere Control over Enemy Property: A Comparative Survey’, 11 L & Contemp
Prob (1945) 3, at 4.
See Newcomb, ‘Office of Foreign Asset Control’, in R.R. Newcomb, Coping with US Export Controls 1994
(Practising Law Institute Commercial Law and Practice Handbook Series No. 705, 1994), at 397, 411.
Ibid., at 409–411.
See e.g., ‘Swiss Freeze $1bn in Gaddafi, Mubarak, Ben Ali Assets’, BBC News Middle East, 3 May 2011,
available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13264931.
See Sommerich, ‘A Brief About Confiscation’, 11 L & Contemp Prob (1945) 152, at 152.
See Staibano, ‘Trends in UN Sanctions: From ad hoc Practice to Institutional Capacity Building’, in
P. Wallensteen and C. Staibano (eds), International Sanctions: Between Words and Wars in the Global System
(2005), at 31, 41–42.
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many countries in North and South America froze the assets of Denmark and Norway
to ensure that those assets would not fall into the hands of Nazi Germany.8 Some of
these measures remained in place for decades as host states sought assurances that
frozen assets would return in an orderly fashion to the original investors.9 In 1990,
many states took similar precautionary measures in response to Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait, freezing accounts to ensure that Kuwait’s assets would remain intact pending
the expulsion of Iraq’s military.10 In other contexts, international asset freezes have
been used to combat public corruption, preserving a target state’s national patrimony
to ensure that misappropriated public funds would be available to advance international human rights for a foreign people.11 In each of these settings, international
intervention ensured that frozen assets would remain available to promote human
rights.
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D Compensation
Fourthly, states have employed asset freezes to secure compensation for victims of
human rights abuse abroad. Compensatory asset freezes differ from coercive asset
freezes to the extent that they do not seek to compel a target state to act or refrain
from acting in any particular manner. Instead, compensatory asset freezes bypass
a foreign state’s volition entirely, using frozen assets to secure remedies for victims of the target state – typically without the target state’s consent. Such was
the case, for example, when US courts froze assets of former-Philippine President
Ferdinand Marcos to ensure that victims of human rights abuse in the Philippines
could obtain compensation in civil actions.17 Similarly, assets frozen during the
Cuban Missile Crisis and Iran Hostage Crisis have been used to satisfy civil judgments against Cuba and Iran for human rights violations such as extrajudicial killing, kidnapping, and torture.18 Thus, international asset freezes may ensure that
targets states cannot escape their legal obligation to provide remedies for human
rights violations.

14

15

16

17
18

As employed throughout this article, the term ‘coercion’ has a narrower meaning than is typical in international law and international relations scholarship. While all financial interventions are ‘coercive’ in
the broad sense that they interfere with a target state’s administration of its own resources, only some
financial interventions are ‘coercive’ in the narrower sense contemplated here, in that they aspire to
induce a target state to satisfy its human rights obligations.
See Carswell and Davis, ‘The Economic and Financial Pressures: Freeze and Sanctions’, in C. Warren
et al., American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis (1985), at 173, 177; O’Harrow and Grimaldi,
‘Libyan Gold Rush Followed End to Sanctions’. Washington Post, 25 May 2011, available at: www.
washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/libyan-gold-rush-followed-end-to-sanctions/2011/05/25/
AGGgbVBH_story.html.
See, e.g., SC Res. 1737, S/RES/1737, pmbl and paras 3–12 (27 Dec. 2006); Staibano, supra note 13, at
41.
See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F 3d 762 (9th Cir. 1996).
E.g., Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F Supp 1239 (SD Fla. 1997); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F
Supp 2d. 62 (DDC 1998); see generally J.K. Elsea, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Suits
Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism (8 Aug. 2008), at 8–9, 69, available at: www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/terror/RL31258.pdf.

Downloaded from http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/ at EJIL member access on November 5, 2014

use to extract humanitarian concessions from a foreign state.14 States have imposed
coercive asset freezes for a variety of humanitarian purposes, including facilitating
the release of American hostages in Iran, securing reparations for victims of Libyan
terrorist attacks, and incentivizing target states to accept human rights monitors.15
Asset freezes have pressured states to abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons, sever
ties with drug cartels and terrorist organizations, and reinstate democratically elected
governments.16 Experience suggests that coercive asset freezes often fail to achieve
their objectives due to tepid enforcement among participating host states and target
states’ unwavering commitment to repressive policies. Whether coercive asset freezes
can be employed successfully to promote human rights abroad will naturally depend,
as well, upon the relative value of a target state’s frozen assets and whether the target
state is reliant upon these resources to advance its core interests.
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E Amelioration

F Punishment
Lastly, host states may seek to freeze foreign assets to punish target states or individual
foreign nationals for violating human rights. International asset freezes have expressive power as a signal that the international community condemns a target state’s
behaviour. In theory, asset freezes may also enable the international community to
inflict retribution upon target states for past human rights violations and deter future
violations. Indeed, US officials frequently characterize international asset freezes as
‘punitive’, emphasizing both deterrence and retribution as important objectives.21
Punitive asset freezes are distinct from coercive asset freezes, for present purposes,
because their primary purpose is not to compel a human rights violator to change its
current practices but rather to bolster the rule of law by imposing a penalty for past
violations and discouraging future violations.
***
19
20

21

SC Res. 778, pmble and para. 5(c)(ii), S/RES/778 (2 Oct. 1992).
Walerstein, ‘Coping with Combat Claims: An Analysis of the Foreign Claim Act’s Combat Exclusion’, 11
Cardozo J Conflict Resolution (2009) 319, at 340 (quoting Paul Bremer).
See Newcomb, supra note 9, at 412 (characterizing financial sanctions against Iran in 1979 as ‘punitive’); Garmise, ‘The Iraqi Claims Process and the Ghost of Versailles’, 67 NYU L Rev (1992) 840, at
841 n. 11 (noting US officials’ contention ‘that severe punishment of Iraq [through financial sanctions]
would serve as a deterrent to other countries’).
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A fifth humanitarian objective that states have pursued through international asset
freezes is the amelioration of humanitarian crises. Ameliorative financial intervention, like compensatory intervention, involves the redistribution of a target state’s
resources without its consent. Rather than focus on remediating past human rights
violations, however, ameliorative intervention involves the unfreezing of a target
state’s assets to address conditions that continue to threaten human rights. For
example, host states might use frozen assets to purchase food, construct temporary shelter, or deliver medical care to internally displaced persons within a target
state. Alternatively, frozen assets might be directed toward post-conflict reconstruction such as rebuilding roads and schools. These ameliorative objectives have been
invoked on several occasions when the international community has imposed asset
freezes against Iraq. During the early 1990s, when the Iraqi government refused
to use its oil revenues to address severe shortages of food and medicine within its
borders, the Security Council directed UN-member states to freeze and transfer Iraqi
assets into an international escrow account for ‘the provision of humanitarian relief
in Iraq’.19 Coalition forces imposed similar measures when they returned to Iraq
ten years later, sequestering the assets of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party to ensure
that these resources would be available to address ‘urgent humanitarian relief and
reconstruction requirements’.20 While these examples are unusual in a variety of
respects, they illustrate how international asset freezes may be employed to ameliorate humanitarian crises abroad.
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3 The International Law of Humanitarian Financial
Intervention
Does international law permit states to freeze foreign assets for all six of these humanitarian objectives? In the discussion that follows, I seek to answer this question by surveying the various international legal regimes that govern international asset freezes.
As with any exercise in legal cartography, some nuances of the legal terrain receive
only passing consideration, inviting further elaboration in future scholarship. To the
extent that the legal norms governing asset freezes require further clarification or
refinement, the following sections identify significant gaps and ambiguities while suggesting tentative strategies for progressive development. What emerges over the course
of this discussion is a serviceable roadmap that states and international organizations
may use to navigate the international law of humanitarian financial intervention.

A Asset Freezes as International Intervention
Humanitarian asset freezes require special legal justification because they represent a
form of ‘dictatorial interference’ that violates general principles of international legal
22

23
24

25

See, e.g., Watson Institute for International Studies, Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and
Implementation, Contribution from the Interlaken Process (2001), at ix, available at: www.seco.admin.ch/
themen/00513/00620/00639/00641/index.html?lang=en.
See, e.g., Newcomb, supra note 9, at 656.
Some asset freezes within these categories might not constitute ‘humanitarian’ measures, strictly speaking. For example, asset freezes designed to disrupt transnational drug cartels (incapacitation) or deter
target states from developing nuclear weapons (coercion) would bear only a highly attenuated connection to international human rights.
See G.C. Hufbauer and J.J. Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (1985), at
4–10.
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In the past, state regulators have tended to characterize all international asset freezes as
‘coercive’,22 or have divided asset freezes into two categories: ‘protective’ and ‘punitive’.23
The foregoing discussion suggests, however, that these traditional categories do not capture the full range of options for humanitarian financial intervention. While coercive asset
freezes are a common response to human rights crises, they are not the only conceivable
response; host states may also freeze foreign assets to incapacitate a repressive regime,
secure compensation for victims, or fund the procurement and distribution of humanitarian aid abroad. In all, there are at least six distinct options that host states may consider
when they freeze foreign assets for humanitarian purposes: preservation, incapacitation,
coercion, compensation, amelioration, and coercion.24 To be sure, states could have other
reasons for freezing foreign assets, including the desire to focus international attention on
a global problem, provide moral support to political allies, or lay the groundwork for military action.25 The international community’s reasons for freezing a target state’s assets
are often multi-faceted and may evolve over time as circumstances change. Nonetheless,
whenever states use international asset freezes as a tool for human-rights promotion, their
humanitarian objectives are likely to fall into one or more of these six categories.
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No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the
personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.35

While international law has yet to articulate with precision when non-forcible actions
rise to the level of ‘intervention’, asset freezes that are designed to incapacitate, coerce,
supplant, or punish a foreign state arguably bear the hallmarks of an objectionable
‘interference or attempted threat’. On this reading, the fact that a host state operates
exclusively within its own territorial jurisdiction when it freezes foreign assets does not
absolve it of international responsibility because the purpose and effect of its actions
26

27
28

29
30

31
32
33

34

35

See S. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (1996), at 10
(‘most writers on the topic of intervention narrow the concept to some form of objectionable or “dictatorial” interference in the affairs of a state’).
UN Charter, Art. 2(7).
See Damrosch, ‘Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic
Affairs’, 83 AJIL (1989) 1, at 6–13.
See UN Charter, Arts 1(2), 2(1), and 55.
Declaration on Intervention, supra note 2; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua, supra note 2, at 101–103, paras 191–192, 202–204 (characterizing this principle as customary international law).
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 2.
Organization of African Unity, Charter, 25 May 1963, 2 ILM (1963) 766, Art. III.
Charter of the Organization of American States, 30 Apr. 1948, 2 UST 2394, TIAS No. 2361, 119 UNTS
3, Arts 18 and 19 (hereinafter the ‘OAS Charter’).
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act (Helsinki Accord), 1 Aug. 1975, 73 Dep’t
St. Bull. 323 (1975), reprinted at 14 ILM (1975) 1292, Principle VI (Non-Intervention in Internal
Affairs).
OAS Charter, supra note 33, Art. 18.
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order.26 There are at least two possible paths one might take to explain why international asset freezes constitute a prima facie wrong under international law. Both paths
lead to the conclusion that states may not freeze foreign assets for humanitarian purposes without furnishing an affirmative legal justification.
One account, which I will call the ‘anti-subordination theory’, holds that any
measures used to subordinate a state’s sovereign powers to foreign control – including international asset freezes – constitute acts of wrongful ‘intervention’. When
host states freeze foreign assets to incapacitate a target state, coerce a target state to
change its policies, direct the allocation of a target state’s resources, or punish a target state or its nationals for human rights violations abroad, they assert dictatorial
control over ‘matters which are essentially within [the other state’s] domestic jurisdiction.’27 As Professor Lori Fisler Damrosch has observed,28 such non-forcible interference arguably transgresses customary principles of external self-determination and
non-intervention that are embedded in the UN Charter,29 affirmed in soft-law instruments such as the UN General Assembly’s Declarations on Intervention30 and Friendly
Relations,31 and endorsed in binding regional agreements in Africa,32 the Americas,33
and Europe.34 The text of the Charter of the Organization of American States captures
the spirit of these instruments:
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36

37

See OECD, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law’, Sept. 2004, available at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf (last visited 22 June 2012) (citing tribunal decisions); Schwebel, ‘The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary International Law’, 98
ASIL Proceedings (2004) 27.
Ibid., at 27–36.
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are transparently interventionist: to subordinate a foreign state and its assets to the
host state’s superintendent power.
Some might contend that the anti-subordination theory casts too broad a net.
Arguably, the international prohibition against ‘intervention’ does not preclude states
from engaging in otherwise lawful acts of retorsion, such as the withdrawal of foreign
aid or the suspension of diplomatic relations, simply because these measures might
compromise a target state’s sovereign interests. From the perspective of international
law, acts of retorsion are wholly unobjectionable when their purpose is to encourage respect for fundamental human rights – an area where states lack legal discretion
to chart a different course. On this second account of the prohibition against intervention, which I will call the ‘wrongful means theory’, only acts that are prima facie
wrongful under international law (e.g., armed attacks, breaches of trade agreements)
constitute wrongful ‘intervention’.
Even under the wrongful means theory, international asset freezes qualify as ‘intervention’. Discriminatory asset freezes are a form of wrongful ‘expropriation’ because
they deprive investors of the right to manage, use, and effectively control their property. When host states impose such measures on foreign investment, customary international law requires them to satisfy the ‘international minimum standard’ of ‘fair
and equitable treatment’.36 Although the precise content of this customary obligation
remains controversial, international tribunals have understood the minimum standard to include respect for due process (e.g., access to justice, non-arbitrariness) and
good faith (e.g., consistency, transparency, non-arbitrariness, respecting reasonable
expectations).37
Over the past decade, a number of states have attracted criticism for failing to comply with these standards when they have frozen the property of alleged terrorist org
anizations and their alleged supporters. At the same time, but with less fanfare, states
also have neglected these safeguards when they have imposed asset freezes against
foreign states and foreign nationals for humanitarian purposes. When foreign nationals find their investments targeted for humanitarian asset freezes, they typically have
no access to formal procedural mechanisms for challenging their designations and
reclaiming their assets. Moreover, states have yet to promulgate formal criteria for
selecting targets, raising concerns about inconsistency, inadequate transparency, and
the potential for arbitrary decision-making. Aside from these requirements of ‘fair and
equitable treatment’, international asset freezes frequently violate other standards
established in bilateral investment treaties such as the requirements of ‘national treatment’, ‘most-favoured-nation treatment’, ‘full protection and security’, and the right
to transfer assets. In short, judged against the prevailing standards for the protection of foreign investment, international asset freezes typically constitute prima facie
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B Authorizing Humanitarian Financial Intervention
International law does permit states to use asset freezes to promote human rights
abroad, but only under limited circumstances. A state that singles out foreign
assets for a targeted freeze without the target state’s consent must ground its
intervention in one of four distinct international legal regimes: collective-security agreements, the law of countermeasures, the law of armed conflict, or customary law governing the enforcement of judicial decisions. Each of these legal
regimes is unique and warrants independent consideration. Analysed collectively,
however, they comprise an integrated legal framework for humanitarian financial
intervention.

1. Collective-security Agreements
Some international asset freezes derive their legal authority from collectivesecurity agreements that authorize intervention for humanitarian purposes. The
pre-eminent example is the UN Charter, which allows the Security Council to
38

39

Some BITs permit derogation from ordinary investment protections as necessary to fulfil their ‘obligations
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of
[their] own essential security interests’: see US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Art. 18, available at:
www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf.
See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 20, GA Res. 56/83, UN Doc. A/
RES/56/83, Annex (12 Dec. 2001) (hereinafter the ‘DARSIWA’).
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wrongful means – measures that require affirmative justification under international
law.38
Some international asset freezes do not qualify as ‘intervention’ under either the
anti-subordination theory or the wrongful means theory. Consider, for example, a host
state that prevents foreign assets from falling into the hands of a predacious occupying power (e.g., Iraq in Kuwait) or freezes the accounts of a foreign official to return
public funds misappropriated through corruption (e.g., former Nigerian dictator Sani
Ambacha). In contexts such as these, a host state could justify financial intervention
based upon either (1) a foreign state’s express consent to protection, where applicable,
or (2) a legal presumption that foreign investors tacitly consent to preservative regulatory action when they place their assets within a host state’s jurisdiction.39 On either
account, a host state that preserves foreign assets from misappropriation could not
be accused of ‘dictatorial interference’ or ‘unfair and inequitable treatment’ in any
meaningful sense.
Of course, such consent-based asset freezes are relatively rare. More often than not,
states that freeze foreign assets to promote human rights abroad do so in the face of a
target state’s sustained and bitter resistance. The question in most contexts, therefore,
is whether the prima facie wrongfulness of such measures can be redeemed by the host
state’s reliance upon superseding norms of international lex specialis. The burden of
demonstrating that such norms exist and apply to a particular context rests upon the
states that undertake humanitarian financial intervention.
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paras 3–12 (coercion); SC Res. 674, at para. 9, S/RES/674 (29 Oct. 1990) (compensation); SC Res. 778,
supra note 19, pmble and para. 5(c)(ii) (amelioration).
See, e.g., Letter dated 2 Sept. 2005 from the Chairman of the SC Committee established pursuant to Res.
1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities addressed to
the President of the SC, at paras 41–42, UN Doc. S/2005/572 (9 Sept. 2005), available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/407/94/PDFN0540794.pdf?OpenElement; cf. Supplement
to an Agenda for Peace, supra note 7, at para. 66.
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coordinate multilateral asset freezes and other non-forcible sanctions to address
‘any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression’.40 Beginning with
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990,41 the Security Council has imposed financial
sanctions against states and non-state actors in many countries – often in an
effort to promote human rights observance.42 Some regional agreements also
provide for coordinated intervention. For example, the Constitutive Act of the
African Union empowers its Assembly of Heads of State and Government to
green-light intervention in response to ‘war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity’ or an affirmative request from a member state ‘to restore peace and
security’.43 Other instruments such as the Treaty of Guarantee Between the
Republic of Cyprus and Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey (the ‘Treaty of
Guarantee’),44 and the 1993 Cotonou Agreement for the resolution of hostilities in Liberia45 likewise contemplate third-state intervention to address systemic
human rights abuses. When states become parties to agreements such as these,
they effectively authorize other states to serve as secondary guarantors for the
human rights of their own people.
Pursuant to its authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council
has imposed asset freezes for a variety of humanitarian objectives. Although the
Security Council rarely articulates its objectives with precision, it has pursued at least
five of the six humanitarian objectives identified in this article: preservation, incapacitation, coercion, compensation, and amelioration.46 Few contemporary observers
would dispute that the Security Council possesses the authority to approve international financial intervention for these purposes when such measures are necessary to
promote international peace and security.
The one humanitarian objective that the Security Council has disavowed consistently is the use of financial sanctions as punishment.47 Whether the Charter confers
punitive powers on the Security Council has been a subject of considerable academic
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debate.48 Given the Security Council’s steadfast refusal to characterize its financial
sanctions as punitive, however, states would be wise to apply a strong presumption
against construing Security Council resolutions to authorize punitive financial sanctions. According to this presumption, states may not invoke the UN Charter or other
collective-security agreements to justify imposing punitive sanctions against foreign
states or foreign nationals in the absence of express authorization from the Security
Council or a comparable regional organization.

2. The Law of Countermeasures

48

49

50

Some legal scholars have argued that the Charter does not authorize punitive sanctions. See, e.g.,
E. Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures (1984), at 70. This argument has
become less persuasive since the 1990s as the SC has invoked its Charter powers to establish ad hoc criminal tribunals such as the ICTY and the ICTR. See SC Res. 827, S/RES/827 (25 May 1993); SC Res. 955,
S/RES/955 (8 Nov. 1994). Arguably, the Charter authorizes the SC to impose punitive financial sanctions
as necessary ‘to maintain or restore international peace and security’: UN Charter, Arts 39, 41.
See Bapat and Morgan, ‘Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data’,
53 Int’l Stud Q (2009) 1075.
C.J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005), at 19–20; see also Case Concerning
the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 1, at paras 82–87; Air Services
Agreement Case (France v. United States), 18 RIAA (1978) 416, at para. 83.
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Humanitarian financial intervention generally will be most effective when the
Security Council requires all UN member states to participate in coordinated financial sanctions.49 In some contexts, however, the Security Council has been unable to
respond to humanitarian crises due to entrenched political opposition or intractable
disagreement about the best way to structure multilateral sanctions. Gridlock in the
Security Council may undermine the effectiveness of multilateral financial intervention by enabling target states to move their offshore assets to safe havens. In an era of
electronic banking, when assets travel across borders at the click of a mouse, even the
slightest delay in multilateral coordination may have profound consequences.
Fortunately, collective-security agreements such as the UN Charter are not the only
source of legal authorization for international financial sanctions. Even in the absence
of authorization from the Security Council or a comparable regional organization,
states are free to impose targeted asset freezes in response to human rights abuses
abroad, provided that they ground their financial intervention in one of three alternative sources of international law: the law of countermeasures, the law of armed
conflict, or customary law governing the enforcement of judicial decisions.
The primary alternative to treaty-based collective-security regimes is the customary international law of countermeasures. The term ‘countermeasures’ refers to ‘the
act of non-compliance, by a State, with its obligations owed to another State, decided
in response to a prior breach of international law by that other State and aimed at
inducing it to respect its obligations’.50 As the International Law Commission (ILC)
has recognized in its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles on State Responsibility) and its Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of International Organizations, customary international law permits
states and regional organizations to freeze foreign assets, suspend trade agreements,

596

EJIL 24 (2013), 583–615

51

52
53

54
55

56
57
58

59
60
61

See DARSIWA, supra note 39, Arts 49–54; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility
of International Organizations, Art. 22, 2 Yrbk Int’l L Comm (2011).
Tams, supra note 50, at 19.
See South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase [1966] ICJ Rep
6, at paras 40–47 (18 July); H. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law (1955), at 312–323.
See Charney, ‘Third State Responsibilities in International Law’, 10 Michigan J Int’l L (1989) 57, at 59.
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase [1970] ICJ Rep 3, at paras 33–34
(5 Feb.).
See DARSIWA, supra note 39, Art. 48(1)(b).
Ibid., at Art. 54 and comments.
Dawidowicz, ‘Public Law Enforcement Without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of State Practice on
Third-Party Countermeasures and Their Relationship to the UN Security Council’, 77 British Yrbk Int’l L
(2007) 333; Tams, supra note 50.
Ibid., at 231.
Ibid., at 235–237.
Even during the ILC’s ultimately inconclusive debates over the customary status of third-state countermeasures, the vast majority of states supported the inclusion of a more robust statement in the Draft
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Tams, supra note 50, at 243–246.
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and impose other non-forcible measures as necessary to address another state’s
breach of international law.51 These countermeasures constitute a form of ‘permitted
self-help’ that compensates for the dearth of centralized institutions capable of con
sistently enforcing states’ international legal obligations.52
In the past, some courts and publicists have conceptualized countermeasures in
exclusively bilateral terms, asserting that states lack standing to impose countermeasures unless they have suffered a direct injury. This bilateral approach would preclude
third states from imposing countermeasures in response to human rights abuses
against foreign nationals abroad.53 Support for this approach has eroded over the past
several decades, however, in favour of a broader conception of third-state standing.54
In the celebrated Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ appeared to endorse third-state countermeasures when it embraced the concept of obligations erga omnes, observing that
some international obligations are owed to all members of the international community.55 Following the ICJ’s lead, the ILC accepted the general concept of obligations erga
omnes in its Draft Articles on State Responsibility,56 although it ultimately declined to
decide whether the concept would support third-state countermeasures.57
Recent studies by Martin Dawidowicz and Christian Tams make a persuasive case that
state practice and opinio juris support third-state countermeasures for violations of erga
omnes norms.58 Dawidowicz and Tams demonstrate that states have imposed third-party
countermeasures for humanitarian purposes in dozens of incidents over the past several
decades.59 This growing body of state practice has involved states from around the world,60
and it has elicited scant opposition from disinterested states.61 Thus, just as financial sanctions have become a standard feature of the Security Council’s response to humanitarian
crises, third-state countermeasures have become firmly embedded in state practice and
opinio juris as a lawful mechanism for responding to breaches of obligations erga omnes.
When states freeze assets as a humanitarian countermeasure, their discretion is circumscribed by a variety of legal constraints. The law of countermeasures does not authorize
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Countermeasures’, 96 AJIL (2002) 817, at 825.
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n. 188.
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See Paparinskis, supra note 68, at 317–351; see generally Verhoeven, ‘The Law of Responsibility and
the Law of Treaties’, in J. Crawford, A. Pellet, and S. Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility
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state regulators to appropriate, transfer, or otherwise effect a permanent deprivation of
frozen assets.62 Hence, states may not freeze frozen assets to incapacitate or punish foreign
states,63 nor may they unilaterally divert frozen assets into victim compensation funds
(compensation) or the coffers of humanitarian relief organizations (amelioration).64 States
may freeze foreign assets only temporarily to compel a target state to abandon unlawful
practices and furnish appropriate remedies (coercion).65 The scope of an asset freeze must
be proportional to a state’s lawful objectives.66 In addition, states ordinarily may not freeze
frozen assets without first calling upon a target state to satisfy its primary obligations,
thereby affording a final opportunity for compliance,67 and they may not impose countermeasures if the target state has initiated independent dispute-resolution procedures.68
Finally, customary international law does not necessarily support the use of countermeasures in response to all human rights violations; third states may impose countermeasures
only when confronting especially grave human rights violations such as genocide, slavery,
or crimes against humanity.69 Thus, the customary law of countermeasures allows states
to freeze foreign assets only under limited circumstances and for limited purposes.
While it is generally accepted that a foreign state’s public property is subject to
countermeasures, BIT protections notwithstanding,70 the same cannot necessarily be
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said of private foreign property. As Martins Paparinskis has shown, the relationship
between countermeasures and private investment is complicated by the fact that the
rights of investors ‘under investment protection treaties can be conceptualized either
as being the rights owed to their home States or rights accruing directly from international treaties’.71 If the former view is correct and investors’ rights are merely derivative of state rights under international custom and BITs (as one arbitral tribunal has
suggested72), then private assets are valid targets for countermeasures. On the other
hand, if international custom and BITs grant investors direct rights that are independ
ent of state diplomatic protection (as another tribunal has concluded73), then private
assets arguably are not a valid target for inter-state countermeasures. At present, it is
unclear which of these approaches, the derivate-rights theory or direct-rights theory,
will gain the upper hand in the jurisprudence of international investment tribunals.
Recent events suggest, however, that an intermediate approach may be emerging
in state practice. Even if states generally may not target private foreign assets when
imposing countermeasures, the intermediate approach suggests that states may freeze
the private assets of foreign officials who bear direct responsibility for a target state’s
internationally wrongful conduct. During the 2011 Arab Spring, for example, the EU
and the US responded to human rights abuses in Libya, Syria, and Iran by freezing the
private assets of public officials who directed or carried out those abuses.74 In each
of these settings, the asset freezes were imposed without Security Council authorization with the stated purpose of coercing a foreign state to respect human rights.75 At
the same time, however, host states took care to emphasize that their countermeas
ures were designed to have an impact on the target state’s governing ‘regime, not the
civilian population’.76 In effect, these countermeasures struck a compromise between
the derivative-rights theory and the direct-rights theory: they preserved direct-rightsstyle investment protection for ordinary foreign investors, while treating the private
property of regime leaders as constructively ‘public assets’ that were valid targets for
interstate countermeasures. Further study will be necessary to confirm whether this
growing body of state practice meets the generality and opinio juris requirements for
customary international law. Nonetheless, the early returns suggest that the law of
countermeasures may be evolving to permit host states to freeze not only the public
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assets of rights-abusing states but also, at a minimum, the private assets of public officials who orchestrate or carry out a target state’s internationally wrongful conduct.

3. The Law of Armed Conflict
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See Borchard, ‘Introduction’, in J.A. Gathings, International Law and American Treatment of Alien Enemy
Property (1940), at vi.
Ibid., at v–vi.
Treaty of Versailles, Art. 297(b) and (e).

Downloaded from http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/ at EJIL member access on November 5, 2014

During armed conflict, customary international law affords a broader menu of
options for humanitarian financial intervention. As in peacetime, states may use
countermeasures to compel a target state to discontinue and remedy its human rights
violations (coercion). Additionally, the law of armed conflict authorizes states at war
to impose financial measures of a more intrusive and even permanent character;
not only may states at war freeze foreign assets to coerce an enemy state, they may
also appropriate foreign assets temporarily for their own use (‘seizure’) or vest foreign
assets permanently in their own treasuries (‘confiscation’)77 to advance their ‘military
objectives’.78 The primary legal constraints on a belligerent state’s authority to impose
such measures are: (1) the principle of military necessity, which requires that such
measures offer ‘a definite military advantage’,79 and (2) the principle of proportionality, which requires that the resulting impact on a civilian population not be ‘excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’.80
Historically, the law of armed conflict’s principle of distinction also played an import
ant role in regulating belligerent asset freezes. From the 18th century to the early 20th
century, customary international law permitted states at war to confiscate an enemy
state’s public assets during wartime, but private assets of enemy nationals were not subject
to belligerent confiscation. States could seize private enemy assets during armed conflict
only on a temporary basis, subject to strict obligations of restitution or compensation.81
This customary distinction between public and private enemy assets – long considered
an ‘impregnable rule’ of customary international law – began to erode during World War
I as the Allied Powers allowed their nationals to exploit the private investments of enemy
nationals for their own gain.82 The Treaty of Versailles papered over these illegal practices
by authorizing the Allies ‘to retain and liquidate all the property and interests of German
subjects or companies under their control in their territory’ pending Germany’s payment of war reparations.83 With the arrival of World War II, the Allied Nations brazenly
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resumed the confiscation of public and private enemy assets within their jurisdictions
to ensure ‘that Germany could never again [use] the external assets of its citizens and
corporations’ to become an economic superpower on the world stage.84 Although the
Allies would later contribute substantial sums to Germany’s post-war reconstruction,
they maintained a firm grip on confiscated private assets within their jurisdictions.85 In
light of these developments, some observers concluded in the 1950s that international
law no longer prohibited the confiscation of private enemy property during time of war.86
The past half-century has seen the pendulum swing back towards broader protection for foreign investment. Beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Germany
and Italy (not coincidentally, the targets of World War II confiscations) introduced
BIT provisions requiring host states to compensate foreign investors for losses attributable to armed conflicts and civil disturbances. Other influential investor-states such as
France, the UK, and the US soon followed suit. By the mid-1980s, such ‘armed conflict’
provisions had become standard features of BITs throughout the world.87 Although
these provisions did not prevent host states from freezing foreign assets during armed
conflict, they did limit states’ discretion to confiscate frozen assets.
How these BIT provisions relate to the general law of armed conflict remains
unclear. One possibility is that these ‘armed conflict’ provisions permit states to seize
foreign assets during armed conflict but do not permit any form of belligerent confiscation. Another possibility is that these provisions merely reaffirm (and perhaps regenerate) the customary norms that governed foreign investment prior to World War I. If
this latter understanding is correct, host states that have adopted BIT ‘armed conflict’
clauses remain free to confiscate an enemy state’s public assets without compensation
pursuant to the law of armed conflict, but they may seize private assets only if they
provide compensation to foreign investors. One virtue of this latter approach is that
it would harmonize international investment law with standards for the treatment of
private property under the law of occupation.88 At present, however, it is impossible to
predict with confidence which of these two approaches will prevail.

Humanitarian Financial Intervention

601

89

90

91
92

93

See E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations: Or Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of
Nations and Sovereigns (1758) (trans. 1876), at 176.
See Basalou, ‘The History of Reprisals up to 1945: Some Lessons Learned and Unlearned for
Contemporary International Law’, 49 Military L & L of War Rev (2010) 335, at 338–341; see generally
Blum, ‘The Crime and Punishment of States’, 38 Yale J Int’l L (forthcoming 2013) (‘Since World War
I, . . . the moral rhetoric of state “crime and punishment” has been excised from the lexicon of international law’).
See Zoller, supra note 48, at 49.
See T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C.B. Macpherson, 1968) (1651), at 111. By way of comparison, the WTO
requires states to obtain authorization before imposing economic retaliation that would otherwise violate their international legal obligations toward target states: see Hathaway and Shapiro, ‘Outcasting:
Enforcement in Domestic and International Law’, 121 Yale LJ (2011) 252, at 266.
See Luban, ‘War as Punishment’, 39 Philosophy & Pub Affairs (2011) 299, at 328 (‘Modern [international] law rightly recoils at the idea of collective punishment’).

Downloaded from http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/ at EJIL member access on November 5, 2014

Some firm conclusions are possible, however, regarding the law of armed conflict’s
applications to humanitarian financial intervention. Perhaps most important, whenever a state intervenes militarily to promote human rights, international law limits its
legitimate ‘military objectives’ to the humanitarian needs of a foreign people. Hence,
states at war may freeze foreign assets to reduce an enemy state’s capacity to use force
(incapacitation) and compel its capitulation (coercion). They may also confiscate
enemy public property and seize private property as necessary to achieve humanitarian objectives such as furnishing food or medical assistance within a target state
(amelioration). The law of armed conflict would not permit a host state to confiscate
foreign assets for its own benefit, however, because such action would fall outside the
scope of a host state’s legitimate humanitarian objectives. Thus, a host state may not
confiscate the assets of a target state to offset the costs of its own military intervention without express authorization from either the Security Council or the target state
itself.
Significantly, the law of armed conflict does not permit states to freeze, seize, or
confiscate foreign assets as a form of punishment during humanitarian military
intervention. For centuries, punitive financial sanctions, like forcible reprisals,
were a standard feature of international armed conflict.89 Over time, however, the
international community has gradually retreated from the idea that states may use
belligerent confiscation and seizure as tools for meting out punishment against an
enemy state.90 Some theorists have argued that the turn away from punitive sanctions reflects international law’s commitment to sovereign equality (parem non habet
imperium).91 Alternatively, punitive sanctions may lack international legal authority
based on the general principle that no state can be judge and party to the same cause
(nemo iudex in sua causa),92 or because such measures effectively direct collective
punishment against a foreign people – a practice that is anathema to contemporary
international law.93 While the theoretical foundations for this principle may be controversial, however, the principle itself is not: under the law of armed conflict, states
are never authorized to freeze, seize, or confiscate foreign assets for purely punitive
purposes.
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4. Enforcing Judicial Decisions
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To the extent that judicial decisions satisfy the standards established by treaty and custom for the lawful expropriation of foreign property, they arguably do not constitute ‘intervention’ under the wrongful
means theory, though in some instances they might still constitute objectionable ‘intervention’ under the
anti-subordination theory.
See, e.g., Center for Justice and Accountability, ‘Case Summary: Jean v. Dorelien,’ available at: www.cja.org/
article.php?list=type&type=78; Van Schaack, ‘In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of
Human Rights in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention’, 42 Harvard Int’l LJ (2001)
141, at 145–147; ‘SA Court Ruling Deals Blow to Mugabe Land Seizures’, ZimOnline, 26 Feb. 2011, available at: www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=5770.
See, e.g., Akehurst, ‘Reprisals by Third States’, 44 British Yrbk Int’l L (1970) 1, at 15–16.
Although many countries allow for the punitive confiscation of private assets in criminal proceedings,
there is less support for the idea that customary international law would permit punitive financial sanctions in civil or administrative proceedings: see Shelton, supra note 63, at 354–367; Janke and Licari,
‘Enforcing Punitive Damages in France After Fountaine Pajot’, Am J Comp L (forthcoming); Bowles, et al.,
‘Economic Analysis of the Removal of Illegal Gains’, 20 Int’l Rev L & Econ (2000) 537, at 543. Given
that the US is virtually alone in permitting punitive damages awards against foreign states, it is highly
questionable whether customary international law supports such a right.
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A fourth strand of international law that authorizes humanitarian financial intervention is customary law governing the enforcement of judicial decisions.94 Applying the
principle of international comity, states routinely accept the validity of foreign judicial decisions that freeze, confiscate, or transfer foreign assets. Increasingly, national
courts have used provisional and plenary remedies such as attachment, garnishment, and sequestration to secure compensation for victims of human rights abuse.95
State regulators, in turn, have treated the enforcement of judicial decisions calling
for financial intervention as a customary exception to international law’s default prohibition against discriminatory financial intervention. Under international law, state
regulators are not merely authorized to enforce decisions of their national courts that
call for international financial intervention; in many contexts they are required to
enforce such decisions. Like the other three strands of international law that author
ize humanitarian financial intervention, national enforcement of judicial decisions
offers a potent mechanism through which states may promote human rights abroad.
In the past, legal publicists have devoted only cursory attention to states’ international legal authority to enforce judicial decisions calling for financial intervention,
and they have not explained how this enforcement authority fits within the broader
fabric of public international law. One prominent scholar has characterized the
enforcement of judicial decisions as a subset of international countermeasures,96
but this assessment misses the mark. When states conduct financial intervention
to enforce judicial decisions, international law permits them to pursue a variety of
humanitarian objectives that are not available under the law of countermeasures
and the law of armed conflict. For example, states that enforce judicial decisions may
provide compensation to successful plaintiffs not only from a defendant state’s public
assets (to the extent consistent with principles of foreign sovereign immunity), but
also from the private assets of individual foreign defendants. Additionally, states may
confiscate the private assets of foreign nationals as a punitive sanction97 – an objective
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C Toward an Integrated Legal Framework
The preceding discussion suggests that the international law of humanitarian financial intervention may develop into an integrated legal framework, the details of which
will come into sharper focus over time as the international community responds to
future humanitarian crises. The table below (Table 1) summarizes the key features of
this emerging legal framework.
Although several international legal regimes authorize asset freezes under prescribed
conditions, they do not all require states to freeze foreign assets. The only circumstance
in which states are legally bound to freeze foreign assets is when the Security Council
or a comparable regional organization imposes mandatory sanctions. Security
Council resolutions directing states to freeze foreign assets pre-empt state and regional
measures when these regimes conflict; states must implement the Security Council’s
directives – adopting the Security Council’s designated humanitarian objectives as

98

99

100

101

See DARSIWA, supra note 39, Arts 31, 34–39; Shelton, ‘Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on
State Responsibility’, 96 AJIL (2002) 833, at 844.
See J. Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (2005); A.V. Freeman, The International Responsibility
of States for Denial of Justice (1970).
See ICCPR, Art. 14, 999 UNTS 171; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 (III) A, UN
Doc. A/RES/217(III), Art. 10 (10 Dec. 1948) (hereinafter the ‘UDHR’). Although framed in terms of EC
law rather than international law, the CJEU’s (then ECJ’s) landmark Kadi case arguably reflects a trend
towards broader recognition of an international right to procedural due process in civil and administrative proceedings. See Joined Cases C–402/05 P & 415/05 P, Kadi v. Council & Commission [2008] ECR
I–6411.
See Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 88, Art. 33; ICCPR, supra note 100, Art. 14.
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that is prohibited under the law of countermeasures.98 Assets confiscated as punishment vest in the host state’s treasury and may be used for any purposes the host
state chooses – not solely for humanitarian ends such as compensation or amelioration. While these distinctive features of the enforcement of judicial decisions are
often taken for granted and merit further study, there is considerable evidence that
the enforcement of judicial decisions constitutes an independent and distinctive legal
basis for humanitarian financial intervention.
International law limits national courts’ authority to freeze foreign assets by requiring courts to accord due process to foreign investors. This principle is reflected in the
venerable customary norm that states may not ‘deny justice’ to foreign nationals
within their borders.99 Elements of due process also feature prominently in leading
HRL and IHL instruments such as the ICCPR, which entitles criminal defendants to
contest punitive sanctions in a meaningful time and manner before an independent
and impartial tribunal.100 Both HRL and IHL prohibit collective punishment against
a group or state by prohibiting courts from punishing defendants without a fair and
individualized assessment of culpability.101 These standards reinforce the international investment regime’s customary requirement of fair and equitable treatment,
guaranteeing basic procedural fairness to foreign investors subject to international
asset freezes.
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Table 1: Which humanitarian objectives may states pursue through financial intervention?
Consent Security
Countermeasures Armed conflict Judicial
agreements
decisions
Preservation
Incapacitation
Coercion
Compensation
Amelioration
Punishment

yes
n/a
n/a
yes
yes
n/a

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no+

no
no
yes*
no
no
no

no
yes±
yes±
yes±
yes±
no

yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes**

their own – even if this requires them to set aside their own preferred objectives for
humanitarian financial intervention.102
Some scholars have argued (unpersuasively, in my opinion) that Security Council
sanctions preclude states and regional organizations from imposing broader asset
freezes as autonomous countermeasures.103 This thesis is premised on the idea that
state and regional countermeasures are ‘subsidiary’ to the UN Charter’s collective
security regime, with the implication that states and regional organizations may
use countermeasures only if the Security Council has entirely failed to act. Once the
Security Council has taken action, these scholars argue, states are no longer free to
devise their own solutions; the Security Council’s sanctions regime pre-empts further
state action.104
There are several problems with the field-pre-emption thesis. First, although the
Charter clearly authorizes the Security Council to establish mandatory financial sanctions,105 ‘nothing in the Charter’s structure or terms suggests that there is an implied
limitation on the rights of Member States to take lawful countermeasures where
the Security Council has acted’.106 Secondly, there is little evidence that the Security
Council has understood its mandatory sanctions regimes to preclude autonomous
bilateral countermeasures. Thirdly, a growing body of state practice – in which the
Security Council’s permanent members feature prominently – suggests that states do
not understand Security Council sanctions to preclude broader countermeasures.107
Fourthly, the field-pre-emption thesis undermines the Security Council’s effectiveness
102

103

104
105
106

107

See, e.g., SC Res. 1483, at paras 22, 23, S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003) (temporarily immunizing Iraqi oil
revenues from legal process and directing states to freeze and transfer Iraqi assets to the UN Development
Fund for Iraq).
See, e.g., Summary Records of the Meetings of the 44th Session, [1992] 1 Yrbk Int’l L Comm 144,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1992 (statement of Alain Pellet); Dupont, ‘Countermeasures and Collective
Security: The Case of the EU Sanctions Against Iran’, 17 J Conflict & Security L (2012) 301; Sicilianos,
‘Countermeasures in Response to Grave Violations of Obligations Owed to the International Community’,
in Crawford, Pellet, and Olleson, supra note 70, at 1137, 1138.
Ibid., at 1142.
UN Charter, Art. 39.
See Calamita, ‘Sanctions, Countermeasures, and the Iranian Nuclear Issue’, 42 Vanderbilt J Transnat’l L
(2009) 1393, at 1438.
See ibid., at 1439–1440; see generally Dawidowicz, supra note 58.
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+ Presumption. * May not apply to private assets. ± Confiscation not permitted for private assets. ** May not apply to
public assets.
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D Humanitarian Constraints
Of course, states and international organizations do not enjoy unfettered discretion to
choose between the various humanitarian objectives that are permissible under collective-security agreements, the law of countermeasures, the law of armed conflict,
and customary law governing the enforcement of judicial decisions. As recognized
in the Naulilaa arbitration, the international community’s response to violations of
international law must always respect ‘the requirements of humanity’.108 Today these
requirements are understood to include the basic protections of both HRL and IHL.109
For example, international asset freezes must not jeopardize foreign nationals’ basic
human rights to food, housing, and essential medical care.110 Even during armed conflict, host states must ensure that asset freezes do not cause civilians abroad to suffer
harm that is excessive in relation to the host state’s humanitarian objectives.111 Under
the UN Charter, the Security Council likewise bears an obligation to tailor financial sanctions narrowly so as to safeguard ‘economic and social progress and development’;112
minimize ‘social, health, and related problems’;113 and promote ‘human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all’.114 Thus, whether states ground humanitarian financial
108
109

110

111
112
113
114

Responsibility of Germany for Damage, supra note 67, at 1026; cf. Kadi, supra note 100.
DARSIWA, supra note 39, Art. 50(1); Prosecutor v. Kupreškič (Trial Judgment), IT-96-16 (14 Jan. 2000),
at para. 534.
See ICCPR, supra note 100, Art. 6; ICESCR, Arts 11 and 12, 993 UNTS 3; UDHR, supra note 100, Arts. 3,
5, 25.
Protocol I, supra note 78, Art. 51(5)(b).
UN Charter, Art. 55(a).
Ibid., Art. 55(b).
Ibid., Art. 55(c); see also Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘The
Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights’, at para. 28, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33 (asserting that ‘[s]anctions regimes that lower economic standards, create
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by making it easier for target states to move their extraterritorial assets pre-emptively
in anticipation of expanded Security Council sanctions. For all of these reasons, the
better view is that Security Council resolutions presumptively have only conflict-preemption effect, not field-pre-emption effect.
In the absence of Security Council action, international law does not provide any standards for resolving conflicts between the various legal regimes that authorize humanitarian financial intervention, nor does it prioritize some humanitarian objectives above
others. As a result, states that freeze foreign assets for humanitarian purposes often confront difficult choices between competing humanitarian objectives. For example, if a foreign head of state embezzles public funds into a private offshore account, a host state may
have to choose whether to freeze the assets to ensure their safe return to the foreign state
(preservation) or use the assets as an inducement to convince the corrupt leader to relinquish power (coercion). In other contexts, host states may face a choice between freezing foreign assets to provide remedies to human rights victims (compensation) or using
the assets to fund post-conflict reconstruction (amelioration). International law commits
these and other decisions to state discretion, and it allows host states to choose not to freeze
foreign assets when financial intervention would undermine important national priorities.
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intervention in Security Council authorization or another source they must always
honour ‘the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience’.115

4 Humanitarian Financial Intervention During the 2011
Libyan Revolution

A Intervention in Libya
The most recent round of international financial sanctions against Libya arose against
the backdrop of the Arab Spring. Inspired by successful protests in Tunisia and Egypt,
Libyans staged peaceful demonstrations in several cities in January 2011. The eastern
port city of Benghazi soon emerged as the epicentre of popular unrest as thousands
of anti-government protesters flooded the streets to express their grievances against
the Qaddafi regime.
Colonel Qaddafi’s response to these peaceful protests was swift and brutal.
Government artillery, helicopter gunships, and snipers fired upon protesters in
Benghazi and neighbouring towns, while ‘thugs armed with hammers and swords’
reportedly ‘attacked families in their homes’.116 Heavy gunfire also greeted peaceful
demonstrators in Tripoli.117 Witnesses reported ‘death squads of foreign mercenaries’
roving the streets to silence residents who ventured outside their homes.118

115

116

117

118

health problems or are detrimental to the observance of human rights would violate Article 55’ of the
UN Charter). Over the past decade, the SC has taken care to tailor its financial sanctions narrowly in
order to preserve target states’ capacity to meet essential ‘basic expenses’ such as the provision of food,
housing, and medical care: see, e.g., SC Res. 1718, at para. 9(a), UN Doc. S/RES/1718 (14 Oct. 2006).
Institut de droit international, ‘Régime des représailles en temps de paix’ (19 Oct. 1934), 38 Annuaire
de l’Institut de droit international 710, Art. 6(4), quoted in Borelli and Olleson, ‘Obligations Relating to
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, in Crawford, Pellet, and Olleson, supra note 70, at 1177, 1177.
Meo, ‘Libya Protests: 140 “Massacred” as Gaddafi Sends in Snipers To Crush Dissent’, Daily Telegraph, 20
Feb. 2011, available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8335934/
Libya-protests-140-massacred-as-Gaddafi-sends-in-snipers-to-crush-dissent.html.
‘Libya: Worshippers “fired on” after prayers in Tripoli’, BBC News Middle East, 25 Feb. 2011, available at:
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12586099.
Chrisafis and Black, ‘After the Air Raids, Gaddafi’s Death Squads Keep Blood on Tripoli’s Streets’, Guardian,
22 Feb. 2011, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/22/air-raids-gaddafi-tripoli.
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Having outlined the international law of humanitarian financial intervention, this section applies this emerging legal framework to the international community’s asset freezes
against Libya during the 2011 Arab Spring. In many respects, this case study illustrates
how confusion about the legal standards governing humanitarian financial intervention
has compromised efforts to coordinate multilateral responses to humanitarian crises.
Throughout the spring and summer of 2011, states advocated a variety of approaches for
responding to crimes against humanity in Libya, including financial sanctions designed
to coerce the Qaddafi regime, preserve assets for a future government, and secure funding to ameliorate civilian suffering within Libya. While some of these proposals enjoyed
a sound grounding in international law, others clearly exceeded states’ legal authority.

Humanitarian Financial Intervention

607

119
120
121
122
123
124

125

126
127
128

Exec. Order No. 13566, supra note 75.
SC Res. 1970, supra note 6, preamble.
Ibid., at paras 4–8.
Ibid., at paras 17–21 and Annex II.
Council Dec. 2011/137/CFSP, 28 Feb. 2011, Art. 6(1)(b), Annex IV, OJ (2011) L58/1.
See, e.g. Mansour, ‘Algeria Freezes Khadafi Assets’, magharebia.com, 8 June 2011, available at: www.
magharebia.com/ cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2011/06/08/feature-06.
‘Libya: The Fall of Gaddafi’, BBC News Africa, 11 Oct. 2011, available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-africa-13860458.
SC Res. 1973, supra note 7, at paras 4, 6, 8.
See Meyers & Balefsky, supra note 3.
O’Harrow & Grimaldi, supra note 15.
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Fearing a further escalation of violence against Libyan civilians, the international community imposed asset freezes and other non-forcible sanctions against the
Qaddafi regime. On 25 February 2011, the US froze the accounts of select Libyan
governmental agencies, instrumentalities, and state-controlled entities, as well as the
personal assets of Qaddafi, his immediate family, and other senior government officials.119 The following day, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
1970, condemning ‘the gross and systematic violation of human rights’ against civilians in Libya and expressing concern that the Qaddafi government’s ‘widespread and
systematic attacks . . . against the civilian population may amount to crimes against
humanity’.120 The Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court121 and imposed mandatory sanctions, including
a targeted asset freeze directed against Qaddafi family members.122 On 28 February
2011, the Council of the EU reported that it had complied with Resolution 1970 and
would impose its own supplemental ‘autonomous measures’, including asset freezes
against 20 Libyan officials whom the EU believed were individually responsible for violence against Libyan civilians.123 By the end of the summer, states throughout the
world had frozen Libyan assets in compliance with the Security Council’s directive.124
With asset freezes in place and violence in Libya escalating by the hour, it was not
long before the international community’s focus shifted toward military intervention.
When insurgents in Benghazi seized control over territory in eastern Libya, international observers began to fear the prospect of a prolonged and savage civil war.
Qaddafi took to the airwaves promising ‘a long-drawn-out war with no limits’ and
declared that his forces would ‘fight until the last man’.125 In response to these threats,
the Security Council authorized UN member states ‘to take all necessary measures’ to
enforce a no-fly zone over Libya and ‘to protect civilians and civilian populated areas
under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi’.126 Assisted
by NATO airstrikes, insurgents under the direction of the Benghazi-based TNC gradually extended their control westward, capturing one coastal town after another until
they reached Tripoli in late August and killed Qaddafi himself two months later.
As the civil war in Libya unfolded, the country’s frozen extraterritorial assets grew to
staggering proportions. By 25 August 2011, experts estimated that the total value of
Libya’s frozen assets had reached US$160 billion,127 including $29 billion sequestered
in a single US bank.128 Libya’s sovereign wealth fund, the Libyan Investment Authority
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130

131
132

133

134
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Carste and Leftly, ‘Prosecutors Fly to Libya To Freeze Gaddafi’s Swiss Assets’, Independent, 23 Oct. 2011,
available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/prosecutors-fly-to-libya-to-freeze-gaddafisswiss-assets-2374512.html.
See ibid.; Faul, ‘Libyan Assets in Africa Far-Reaching, Little Known’, ABC News, 11 June 2011, available at: http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=13818183; Liberto, ‘Libya Set To Get Back $37
Billion from US’, CNNMoney, 20 Oct. 2011, available at: http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/20/news/
economy/Libyan_assets/index.htm.
Carste and Leftly, supra note 129.
See, e.g., ‘Netherlands Unfreezes Libyan Assets for Medical Supplies’, reliefweb, 16 Aug. 2011, available at:
http://reliefweb.int/node/441104; US Draft Resolution (Provisional), S/2011/535, 24 Aug. 2011, available at: www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/
Libya%20S%202011%20535.pdf.
SC Res. 1970, supra note 6, at para. 19(a); see generally UN SCOR, 6622nd Meeting, at 5, UN Doc. S/
PV.622 (26 Sept. 2011) (statement of Sanctions Committee Chair José Filipe Moraes Cabral).
SC Committee Established Pursuant to Res. 1970 (2011) Concerning Libya, List of Individuals Subject
to the Measures Imposed by Para. 15 of Res. 1970 (2011) (the Travel Ban) and/or Para. 17 of Res. 1970
(2011) or Para. 19 of Res. 1973 (2011) (the Asset Freeze), at 7–8, 16 Dec. 2011, available at: www.
un.org/sc/committees/1970/pdf/List%20of%20Individuals%20and%20Entities.pdf.
‘Libya: US$100b Libyan Assets Defrozen, Says Finance Minister’, Libya-Business News, 20 Dec. 2011, available at: www.libya-businessnews.com/2011/12/20/libya-us100b-libyan-assets-defrozen-says-financeminister.
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(known by its Arabic title as ‘the mother of all funds’), accounted for approximately
$70 billion alone.129 The more state regulators searched, the further Libya’s investments were found to extend, including major stakes in Africa’s only communications
satellite, RASCOM; Africa’s only continent-wide radio station, Africa No. 1; influential
British publisher Pearson, the parent company of the Financial Times; the Italian soccer club Juventus; and a diverse portfolio of luxury hotels, high-rise apartment buildings, farms, banks, mining interests, and petrol stations scattered across the globe.130
Investigators speculated that they might recover another $80 billion as they continued to ferret out the previous regime’s hidden investments.131
As the TNC consolidated its control over Libya and worked toward the formation of
a new government, the Security Council gradually narrowed its mandatory sanctions
during the late summer and autumn of 2011. In mid-August, the Security Council’s
Sanctions Committee for Libya began authorizing humanitarian exceptions to allow
frozen assets to be used for humanitarian aid, as contemplated in Resolution 1970.132
By 26 September 2011, these exceptions allowed host states to unfreeze roughly
$16 billion in Libyan assets to address ‘basic needs’ of the Libyan people.133 On 16
December 2011, the Sanctions Committee scaled back its asset freeze even further
by permitting states to release assets of the Central Bank of Libya (Central Bank) and
the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB) while maintaining mandatory sanctions over
other investment vehicles that were believed to be under the continuing control of the
Qaddafi family.134 Within a matter of days, states throughout the world had pledged to
unfreeze the full assets of the Central Bank and LAFB – approximately $100 billion –
and release these funds expeditiously to the TNC.135 Despite these pledges, the unfreezing and unwinding of Libya’s extraterritorial assets proved to be a lengthy process. By
mid-Spring 2012, the vast bulk of Libya’s extraterritorial assets remained under the
control of foreign states.
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B Freezing Assets Before Resolution 1970

136

137

138

139

When international asset freezes commenced in 2011, no BIT was in force between the US and Libya,
although the two countries had concluded a general framework agreement to structure future discussion
about trade and investment.
See Exec. Order No. 13566, supra note 75 (finding that the Qaddafi regime had ‘us[ed] weapons of
war, mercenaries, and wanton violence against unarmed civilians’); Tams, supra note 50, at 144–145
(observing that ‘war crimes and crimes against humanity . . . are often considered to give rise to obligations erga omnes’).
President Obama’s executive order authorizing asset freezes against Libya stressed the ‘serious risk that
Libyan state assets will be misappropriated by Qadhafi, members of his government, members of his family, or his close associates’: Exec. Order No. 13566, supra note 75 (emphasis added). If the US feared that
Qaddafi family members would misappropriate state assets at some point in the future, the law of countermeasures would not permit intervention until that wrong occurred. See the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project,
supra note 50, at 55, para. 83; DARSIWA, supra note 39, Art. 49(1). Countermeasures arguably would
be permissible, however, to compel Qaddafi loyalists to return state assets obtained previously through
public corruption.
See Corn Products, supra note 73, Decision on Responsibility, 15 Jan. 2008, at paras 161–179. On this
theory, the US would have to show that frozen assets were, in fact, state assets misappropriated from the
Libyan people.
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From the earliest days of the Libyan revolution, the international community confronted challenging legal issues concerning Libya’s extraterritorial assets. An important
preliminary question involved the legality of unilateral asset freezes imposed by the US
and the EU. While few international lawyers questioned the Security Council’s authority
to impose mandatory multilateral asset freezes pursuant Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
the legality of unilateral third-state asset freezes remained somewhat murky. Did international law authorize the US to freeze Libyan assets before the Security Council issued
Resolution 1970? Did the US and the EU satisfy international law when they later
extended ‘autonomous measures’ beyond the scope of Resolutions 1970 and 1973?
The US must have relied upon the customary law of countermeasures when it froze
Libyan assets prior to Resolution 1970. Other potential bases for financial intervention
– Security Council authorization, the law of armed conflict, and custom governing the
enforcement of judicial decisions – were not plausibly in play at the time.136 Construed
as a third-party countermeasure, the US’ unilateral asset freeze was a permissible
response to the Libyan government’s flagrant violation of its erga omnes obligations to
refrain from war crimes and crimes against humanity.137 US action may have been justified, as well, to preserve public funds obtained by the Qaddafi family through corruption (under the principle of tacit consent) and to coerce the Qaddafi family to return
misappropriated public funds (as a countermeasure).138 Although the asset freeze did
not succeed in convincing the Qaddafi regime to cease violating its obligations erga
omnes, the US’ humanitarian objectives were consistent with international law.
Some might question whether international law would permit the US to freeze the
private assets of Qaddafi loyalists rather than limit countermeasures to public assets
of the Libyan state. As discussed previously, at least one international arbitral tribunal has construed international investment law to confer direct rights on private
investors, precluding host states from freezing private assets under the law of countermeasures.139 This article has argued, however, that the recent practice of the EU
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and the US (including asset freezes against the Qaddafi regime) may reflect the emergence of a new customary norm, one that would allow host states to freeze the private
assets of foreign officials who contribute directly to their state’s international wrongs.
Assuming that this suggestion is correct, the US was free to freeze the private assets
of Libyan officials as necessary to compel the Qaddafi regime to abandon its crimes
against humanity.

C Freezing Assets After Resolution 1970

D Unfreezing Assets without Security Council Authorization
Once asset freezes had been imposed against Libya, it was not long before states began
to consider whether they could unfreeze and transfer Libyan assets to the TNC without Security Council authorization. Beginning in March 2011, TNC representatives
urged the international community to allow them to access Libya’s frozen assets or
140

See, e.g., Council Reg. 204/2011, supra note 75; Council Implementing Reg. 272/2011, OJ (2011)
L76/32; Council Implementing Reg. 288/2011, OJ (2011) L78/13; Council Reg. 572/2011, OJ (2011)
L159/2; Exec. Order No. 13566, supra note 75, at paras 1–2; Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada
on Implementing Sanctions Against Libya, 27 Feb. 2011, available at: www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.
asp?id=3997.
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The day after the US imposed its preliminary asset freeze, some of the legal issues
raised by unilateral US action were mooted by Resolution 1970, which approved the
US’ list of targets and appointed an international sanctions committee to make further designations pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Security Council’s
financial intervention raised another important question, however: did Resolution
1970 pre-empt autonomous measures by individual states and regional organizations (field-pre-emption) or did it merely impose minimum requirements that states
and regional organizations could supplement with more robust measures of their own
(conflict-pre-emption)? If field-pre-emption applied, the US would have to await further Security Council authorization before it could expand its asset freeze. Field-preemption would also call into question subsequent autonomous measures by Canada
and the EU – asset freezes that exceeded the scope of Resolutions 1970 and 1973.140
The better view is that the Security Council’s mandatory sanctions did not preclude
Canada, the EU, and the US from imposing broader asset freezes under the law of
countermeasures. As discussed previously, neither the text of the UN Charter nor state
practice suggests that Security Council sanctions automatically pre-empt autonomous state or regional countermeasures. Moreover, the broader asset freezes imposed
by Canada, the EU, and the US supported the Security Council’s coercive humanitarian objectives and prevented the Qaddafi regime from moving assets to evade future
Security Council sanctions. Given the scale of the Qaddafi regime’s human rights
abuses, it would be difficult to argue that those measures were disproportionate. Thus,
there are good reasons to believe that international law permitted Canada, the EU,
and the US to impose asset freezes against Libya that were broader than the Security
Council’s mandatory sanctions regime.
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See Johnson et al., ‘US, Libyan Rebels Discuss Aid’, Wall St J, 25 May 2011, available at: http://online.wsj.
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use those assets as collateral for loans or lines of credit.141 The TNC argued that it
needed a prompt infusion of cash to sustain its military campaign against forces loyal
to Colonel Qaddafi.142 Further, it insisted that civilians would be without food, medical care, and essential public services if the international community did not release
Libya’s frozen assets immediately.143
By late summer, several states had answered the TNC’s plea for assistance. France,
Italy, and Turkey recognized the TNC as Libya’s legitimate government and took steps
to lift restrictions on Libya’s frozen assets. Italy extended a line of credit to the TNC
using frozen Libyan funds as collateral.144 France and Turkey released frozen assets to
the TNC in early August.145
The trouble with these measures was that the Security Council had yet to lift its
mandatory sanctions.146 Although other states expressed sympathy for the TNC’s
grave financial situation, and some publicly considered taking steps similar to those
of France, Italy, and Turkey,147 most concluded in the end that their ‘hands were tied
by United Nations sanctions’.148 Among these more restrained states, Russia was
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E Using Frozen Assets for Other Purposes
When the Security Council loosened its mandatory financial sanctions towards the
end of 2011, states gradually made Libyan assets available to the TNC. This process
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default.aspx?pageid=438&n=libyan-rebels-ask-turkey-for-access-to-frozen-assets-2011-07-06.
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The fact that France, Italy, and Turkey had recognized the TNC previously as the ‘legitimate government’
of Libya was irrelevant for these purposes because Res. 1970 and 1973 did not provide for the SC’s sanctions to be lifted by unilateral state action under such circumstances.
See, e.g., Office of Foreign Asset Control, General License No. 7a, General License with Respect to the
Libyan Oil Company and its Subsidiaries, 31 CFR 570, 19 Sept. 2011, available at: www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/libya2_gl7a.pdf.
As Stefan Talmon has observed, prior to the TNC achieving recognition as the de jure ‘government’ of
Libya, the Qaddafi government remained ‘the only authority’ with a valid legal claim to access and
‘legally dispose of Libyan State assets abroad’ once the assets were unfrozen: Talmon, ‘Recognition of
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the most outspoken critic of unilateral action, stridently condemning the release of
Libyan assets to the TNC as ‘absolutely illegal’.149
Even with the benefit of hindsight, it remains unclear whether France, Italy, and
Turkey satisfied international law when they unfroze Libyan assets without Security
Council authorization. Contrary to Russia’s protestations, Resolutions 1970 and 1973
did not, in fact, declare that any efforts to thaw Libyan assets for the TNC’s benefit would
be ‘absolutely illegal’. On the other hand, these resolutions did not give host states a
blank checque to unfreeze any Libyan assets they wished for humanitarian purposes,
as some diplomats suggested at the time.150 Properly understood, the scope of a state’s
discretion to unfreeze Libyan assets turned upon which legal regime – Security Council
sanctions or the law of countermeasures – governed particular frozen assets. To the
extent that Resolutions 1970 and 1973 applied, states that released or collateralized
Libyan assets without express authorization from the Security Council’s sanctions committee violated their obligations under the UN Charter.151 Conversely, states were free
to dissolve their autonomous asset freezes as soon as they determined that the coercive
objectives of these measures had been achieved.152 Thus, if it turns out that the assets
unfrozen by France, Italy, and Turkey were not subject to mandatory Security Council
resolutions, these assets could be released to the TNC as the recognized ‘legitimate government’ of Libya without further Security Council action.153
Unfortunately, press accounts do not indicate whether the specific assets involved in
these incidents were covered by Resolutions 1970 and 1973. If the assets did, indeed, fall
within the ambit of the Security Council’s mandatory financial sanctions, any attempt to
thaw these assets would have been ‘absolutely illegal’ from the perspective of international
law. On the other hand, if the assets under consideration were subject only to autonomous
countermeasures at the time, customary international law would have permitted France,
Italy, and Turkey to release or collateralize those assets for the benefit of the Libyan people.
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was preceded, however, by months of political wrangling over proposals to dispose
of the assets in other ways. Some states considered using frozen assets to purchase
arms and supplies for Libyan insurgents.154 In the US, members of Congress debated
confiscating Libyan assets to offset the costs of American military action.155 Other pol
icymakers advocated linking the release of ‘frozen assets to Libyan cooperation with
investigations into Gadhafi-era terrorist attacks’.156 While none of these proposals was
ultimately put into practice, they reflect the uncertain fate of Libya’s frozen assets at
the height of the Libyan revolution.
Many of the proposals that circulated during this period were inconsistent with
Resolution 1970, which anticipated that frozen Libyan assets should be preserved to
ensure that they would, ‘at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and
for the benefit of the people of [Libya]’.157 Had the Security Council not required the
return of frozen assets to Libya, international law would have permitted host states to
continue to freeze Libyan assets for other purposes, such as to compel Libya to investigate and provide remedies for past acts of state-sponsored terrorism (under the law
of countermeasures)158 or to satisfy civil or criminal judgments against the Libyan
government or designated Libyan officials. Such measures would have been permissible as long as they satisfied the general humanitarian standards of HRL and IHL. On
the other hand, states would have lacked authority to confiscate Libyan assets for their
own use without authorization from the Security Council, an appropriate court, or the
Libyan government. Under no circumstances would the law of countermeasures have
allowed host states to confiscate and vest Libyan assets in their own treasuries. While
it might be tempting to conclude that the law of armed conflict would authorize coalition states to confiscate Libyan assets, the facts on the ground do not support this thesis. At the Security Council’s direction, coalition forces played a narrowly defined role
during the Libyan revolution, providing only air support and intelligence to insurgent
forces.159 Given the grave humanitarian needs of the Libyan people and the limited
engagement of coalition forces, confiscating frozen Libyan assets to offset the costs of
coalition intervention could not reasonably be considered necessary and proportional
under the law of armed conflict. To be sure, had the Security Council not directed that
states return frozen assets to the TNC, states that recognized the TNC as the legitimate
government of Libya could have used frozen assets to purchase arms for insurgents or
fuel for their own aircraft with the TNC’s freely bestowed consent. Absent such consent from the TNC or the Security Council, however, states that supplied arms and air
support to the TNC would have lacked legal authority to confiscate Libyan assets to
offset the costs of their military intervention.
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F Delaying the Release of Frozen Assets

5 Conclusion
If there is one lesson to be drawn from recent debates over the international community’s financial intervention in Libya, it is that the legal standards governing humanitarian financial intervention remain poorly understood. Although the international
community uses asset freezes regularly as a mechanism for promoting human rights
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By the end of December 2011, most of Libya’s offshore assets were no longer subject
to mandatory Security Council sanctions, and states had announced plans to release
over US$100 billion dollars to the TNC. Despite these developments, the thawing and
delivery of frozen assets to the TNC proceeded slowly.160 Publicly, some states expressed
concern that unfrozen assets might not reach the TNC securely. Privately, states probably questioned whether Libya’s new transitional government could be trusted to husband the country’s resources prudently for the benefit of the Libyan people. As time
progressed, continuing delays in the release of frozen assets became a point of friction
in relations between the TNC and foreign governments.
As a matter of international law, a strong case can be made that host states were
entitled to maintain their asset freezes until the TNC provided adequate assurances that
it would respect, protect, and fulfil human rights for the Libyan people. Throughout
the spring of 2012, Libya had yet to install a permanent national government capable
of guaranteeing stability within the country, and sporadic violence continued to arise
between Qaddafi loyalists, local militias, and security forces under the TNC’s command. Although the Security Council stressed that Libyan assets should return ‘as
soon as possible,’ it also emphasized the ‘importance of making these assets available
in a transparent and responsible manner in conformity with the needs and wishes of
the Libyan people’, and it underscored the TNC’s obligations to ‘protect Libya’s population, restore government services, and allocate Libya’s funds openly and transparently’.161 Given Libya’s history of authoritarianism and corruption, host states had
good reason to proceed with caution, as directed by the Security Council. Indeed, even
TNC leaders expressed concern that thawing assets too rapidly could enable Qaddafi
loyalists to access and liquidate frozen accounts.162 Thus, international law permitted
host states to proceed cautiously with the unfreezing of Libyan assets, taking care to
ensure that all frozen assets would return to the people of Libya in an orderly manner
through a credible and rights-respecting Libyan government.
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around the world, states and international organizations rarely define their humanitarian objectives with precision. Equally troubling, the legal standards that govern
international asset freezes have developed in a fragmented and piecemeal fashion,
with scant attention being paid to the integrity and coherence of this field of international law as a whole.
To address these concerns, this article has endeavoured to illuminate the humanitarian objectives and legal standards that govern international financial intervention.
The legal framework developed in this article should prove useful as host states consider
whether international law would permit them to freeze foreign assets in response to
human rights abuses abroad. Equally important, the typology of humanitarian objectives outlined in this article should enable host states and international organizations
to articulate their objectives more clearly when they freeze foreign assets to promote
human rights. International asset freezes will often serve coercive purposes, compelling states to honour their international human rights obligations. But when coercion
fails (as was the case in Libya), asset freezes may still advance important humanitarian objectives such as incapacitation, compensation, or amelioration. Whether host
states may pursue any particular humanitarian objective in a given context depends
upon the interplay between several distinct international legal regimes: international
investment law, customary principles of non-intervention, collective-security agreements such as the UN Charter, the customary law of countermeasures, the law of
armed conflict, and international custom governing the enforcement of judicial decisions. Whenever states impose asset freezes to promote human rights abroad, they
must take care to pursue only those discrete humanitarian objectives that are consist
ent with international law.

